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Abstract
I provide empirical evidence that badly governed firms respond more to aggregate shocks
than do well governed firms. I build a simple model where managers are prone to over-
invest and where shareholders are more willing to tolerate such a behavior in good
times. The model successfully explains the average profit differences as well as the
cyclical behavior of sales, employment and investment for firms with different governance
qualities. The quantitative results suggest that governance conflicts can explain 30% of
aggregate volatility.
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1 Introduction
I propose a simple model to study the implications of corporate governance for the busi-
ness cycle, based on the idea that managers tend to expand their firms beyond the profit-
maximizing size. What matters for aggregate volatility is whether these deviations from
profit maximization are more likely to happen in booms or in recessions. This, in turn,
depends on how the relative costs and benefits of monitoring firms’ decisions change with
the state of the economy. I take the view that the comparative advantage of managers is
to come up with new ideas to seize profit opportunities, and that scrutinizing managerial
decisions is a time consuming process. Since it is particularly costly to miss a profit op-
portunity when the demand for the firm’s product is high, shareholders are more willing to
leave discretionary authority in the hands of managers in good times than in bad times.
I study the implications of these governance conflicts in a standard dynamic macro
model with imperfect competition in the goods markets. Imperfect competition is impor-
tant because it creates rents over which managers and shareholders can fight. Managerial
tendencies to increase investment, employment and output — together with the proposition
that shareholders leave more discretion to managers in good times — implies that corporate
governance conflicts amplify aggregate fluctuations. Quantitative simulations, based on the
new empirical evidence presented in section 2, suggest that aggregate volatility would be
30% lower if all firms were always perfectly governed.
This research is related to the microeconomic literature on governance conflicts between
managers and shareholders. Jensen (1986) emphasizes the idea that managers tend to
expand their firms beyond the profit-maximizing size. On the macroeconomic side, I build
on Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) and on Rotemberg and Woodford (1992)1 for the role of
imperfect competition, and on Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) for the implications
of financial frictions.
Section 2 provides new evidence on the business cycle properties of firms with different
governance qualities. Section 3 and 4 present the model. Section 5 explains the intuition
for the amplification mechanism. Section 6 discusses the calibration method and how it
1The empirical finding that markups of prices over marginal costs are counter-cyclical is relevant for my
paper because a firm operating on its demand curve can expand its output only by lowering its markup. See
Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) for a survey, and Bils and Kahn (2000) for recent evidence.
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relates to the existing empirical literature about governance conflicts. Section 7 presents
the impulse responses and the simulations of the model. Section 8 concludes. Derivations
and technical details are in the appendix.
2 Evidence
Figure 1 shows that firms with bad governance have lower profit margins. The governance
data come from the Investor Responsibility Research Center and are based on 24 distinct
corporate-governance provisions. Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) construct an index by
adding one for every provision that reduces shareholders rights, so that higher values mean
worse governance. The index is constructed for the 1990’s. The profit margin is the ratio
of median income during the period 1989-2001 to median capital expenditures during the
same period, relative to the average of firms in the same industry and age group. The figure
shows that the profit to investment ratio of badly governed firms is 6% below average, while
the profit to investment ration of well governed firms is 7% above average. The difference
is significant at the 5% level. These results are in line with Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick
(2003) who report that badly governed firms have lower profits to sales ratios.
The original index ranges from 5 to 14, and I have created three groups with cutoffs at
8 and 12, corresponding to the 25th and 75th percentiles of the distribution of the index. I
will use these three groups in the calibration exercise. The governance index is not available
for all years and all firms, and it can vary over time. To be on the safe side, I decided to
compare firms with persistently bad governance to firms with persistently good governance,
and I kept only the firms whose index has a standard deviation of less than one over the
sample period. In practice, the index is very persistent over time and the results are robust
to keeping all firms. I sort firms among the three groups according to the earliest available
index.
Figures 2a and 2b show that the capital expenditures and sales of firms with bad gov-
ernance are more cyclical than the investment and sales of firms with good governance.
Sensitivity to aggregate shocks is defined as the regression coefficient, β, of the growth
rate of capital expenditures (sales) on the growth rate of aggregate private non-residential
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investment (GDP):
git = αi +
¡
βGovernance + γIndustry + δAge
¢× g¯t + εit
Industry is the one digit SIC code of firm i. Age is the age group, using 5 groups and cutoffs
at percentiles (10, 25, 50, 75). Equivalently, I could have computed the betas by running a
separate time series regression for each firm, and adjusting later for age and industry effects2.
The regression results are reported in table 1. Figure 2 is based on regressions 4 and 8. On
average, when aggregate investment increases by 1%, the capital expenditures increase by
1.35% for firms with bad governance, and by 0.65% for firms with good governance: The
difference is 0.7 as reported in table 1, column 4. Quite remarkably, the same is true for
sales growth and for employment growth: Along all margins, badly governed firms expand
more in booms, and contract more in recessions than do well governed firms.
3 Model
I introduce governance issues into a standard general equilibrium model. The consumers
solve
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subject to the budget constraint
(1 + g)Kt+1 = (1− δ (ut))Kt +WtLt + utRtKt +Πt − Ct −
γ
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Kt
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Rt is the rental price of capital services, ut is the rate of utilization of the existing stock
of capital Kt, Πt are aggregate profits, g is the trend growth rate of labor productivity
and γ captures adjustment costs for investment. Zt is an exogenous aggregate labor supply
shock3. The cost of higher utilization is captured by an increase in the depreciation rate
δ (ut) as in King and Rebelo (1999). Capital utilization is introduced only because it is
important in the quantitative analysis. It plays no role for the theory.
2This gives the same results. The results would be numerically identical if there were no missing values
(i.e. perfectly balanced panel). In selecting the sample, I have allowed no more than 1 missing year per
firm. The number of missing values is slightly larger for capital expenditures, as can be seen at the bottom
of table 1.
3Labor supply shocks provide a convenient way to introduce aggregate shocks that do not directly affect
the technological frontier of the economy. They can be interpreted, for instance, as nominal spending shocks
that interact with nominal wage rigidities. See Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002)
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The economy produces a final good using differentiated inputs. The final good is pro-
duced competitively and it can be used for consumption and investment. The differentiated
goods are produced by a continuum of mass N of firms indexed from 0 to 1. N will be
determined in equilibrium by a free entry condition. The production function for the final
good is4
Yt = N ×
µZ 1
0
y
σ−1
σ
it
¶ σ
σ−1
(3)
and the final good producers solve
max
yit
PtYt −N ×
Z 1
0
pityit
where yit is the production of intermediate good i at time t.
Equation (3) implies that each intermediate producer i faces an isoelastic demand curve:
yit =
Yt
N
×
µ
pit
Pt
¶−σ
(4)
The price level, Pt, is such that
R 1
0
³
pit
Pt
´1−σ
= 1. This is also the zero profit condition
for the final good producers. There is monopolistic competition in the differentiated goods
sector. The production function for intermediate good i is characterized by constant returns
to variable factors and some fixed costs. The variable factors are the flows of capital and
labor services: kit and lit. Note that kit includes utilization5. The production function for
good i at time t is:
yit = θt qit k
1−α
it l
α
it (5)
θt is an exogenous aggregate technology shock6 and qit is the endogenous firm-specific
productivity (to be discussed shortly). The fixed costs for firm i are Φit units of final good.
4 I choose the measure of firms to be uniform and I omit di when it is obvious that the integration refers
to i.
5 It makes the notations simpler (ut appears only in the aggregate resource constraint below) and, since
capital can be freely traded between firms, it is inconsequential. For the same reason, the assumption that
the utilization rate is chosen by the capital holders (consumers) is also inconsequential.
6 I do not vary Z and θ at the same time. I calibrate using either one or the other. I introduce θ for the
sake of completeness. Since I have verified that the quantitative and qualitative results do not depend on
whether the economy is driven by θ or by Z, I report only the simulations with Z. The one exception concerns
the behavior of the real wage. For that variable, the value added of the model with governance is higher if
one considers shocks that do not change the aggregate technology, such as demand shocks (remember that
demand shocks together with nominal wage inertia are equivalent to shocks to Z). Demand shocks without
governance conflicts imply a counter-cyclical real wage, as discussed in section 7. The governance model
overturns this counter-factual prediction — as would any model of counter-cyclical markups.
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The (real) profits of firm i are therefore:
πit =
pit
Pt
yit −Wtlit −Rtkit −Φit (6)
I now describe the governance environment. To make the problem non-trivial, I as-
sume that managers have a comparative advantage in running the firms, but that their
objectives differ from the ones of the shareholders. When managers run the firms, the pro-
ductivity is qit = 1. Let {km, lm,Φ} be the profit maximizing solution: The fixed cost Φ
is exogenously given by technology, and {km, lm} maximize (6) subject to (4) and (5) with
qit = 1. However, governance conflicts are such that managers do not always implement the
profit maximizing solution. Specifically, I assume that managers’ favorite implementation
is {(1 + η∗) km, (1 + η∗) lm, (1 + τ∗)Φ}. In words, managers prefer firms that are larger by
η∗ for capital and labor, and by τ∗ for fixed costs. This is consistent with much of the
corporate finance literature: I will discuss the existing evidence when I calibrate the model.
I introduce two parameters (and only two) for both theoretical and empirical reasons. The-
oretically, η∗ and τ∗ mean different things: η∗ rises output while τ∗ does not. Empirically,
η∗ will capture the idea that managers prefer to buy the latest machines even if they are not
really needed, or that they over-estimate the appropriate scale of operation for their firms
(for instance because they over-estimate their own productivity q). On the other hand,
τ∗ will capture the standard managerial perks (private jets,..) as well as outright stealing
and excessive compensation. Finally, the evidence presented in section 2 suggests that one
parameter (η∗) is enough to capture the behavior of sales, investment and employment.
Shareholders have a monitoring technology that allows them to enforce profit maximiza-
tion, but with a lower productivity, q
i
≤ 1, which is distributed across firms according to
the c.d.f. F (q). I will use q
i
as the measure of governance quality for firm i: When q
i
= 1,
shareholders can enforce their rights without cost. When q
i
< 1, it is costly to control the
manager. The decision to use the “managerial” technology {1; η∗; τ∗} or the alternative
technology
n
q
i
; 0; 0
o
is made to maximize the value of the firm7.
A rational expectations equilibrium for this economy is a set of stochastic processes
for the exogenous shocks (either θt or Zt) and for the endogenous prices and quantities.
{lit, kit, pit}i solve the intermediate firms’ program described above, {Yt, yit} are deter-
7The appendix contains a discussion of the role of financial incentives.
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mined by (3), and consumers maximize (1) over {Kt+1, Ct, Lt, ut, } 8. All the agents take
{Pt,Wt, Rt} as given, and the following market clearing conditions hold:
Yt = Ct + It +N ×
Z 1
0
Φit
utKt = N ×
Z 1
0
kit
Lt = N ×
Z 1
0
lit
This definition of equilibrium is conditional on the number of firms, N , which is constant
at business cycle frequencies. To pin down N , I impose that a free entry condition holds in
the non-stochastic steady state of the economy (see Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) and
the appendix).
4 Corporate Governance
One can think of the governance technology in the following way. Agents inside the firm
(CEO, managers, employees) come up with plans to take advantage of profit opportunities
as they appear. A plan specifies a technology and the amounts of capital and labor that
must be hired to implement it. Supervisors (the board for the CEO, the CEO for the division
managers) can either rubber-stamp the plan proposed by the agent, or they can scrutinize
it. Scrutinizing is time consuming and entails the possibility that the profit opportunity will
be missed, so that the expected productivity under close monitoring drops to q
i
. On the
other hand, scrutinizing allows the supervisors to cut wasteful expenses (τ∗: inefficiencies,
private jets, outright stealing..), and to make sure that the project is implemented on the
right scale (η∗: buying expensive machines, hiring too many employees, refusing to close
down a plant..).
Proposition 1 describes the optimal choice to rubber-stamp or to monitor closely for
firm i at time t.
Proposition 1 The shareholders of firm i rubber-stamp managerial propositions if and
only if
qi < Qt
8The assumption that consumers choose ut is immaterial as long as there are no firm specific adjustment
costs.
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where
Qt =
µ
κ (η∗)− τ
∗Φ
At
¶ 1
σ−1
(7)
and
At ≡
Ã
µ
θt
µ
Rt
1− α
¶1−αµWt
α
¶α!1−σ Yt
σN
κ (η∗) ≡ (1 + η∗)× µ (1 + η
∗)−
1
σ − 1
µ− 1 ; µ =
σ
σ − 1
Proof. The decision rule is simple: the shareholders will rubber-stamp if and only if
πmt
¡
q
¢
< π∗ (1)
Using some simple algebra, one can see that the maximum profits are
πmt (q) = Atq
σ−1 − Φ
And the profits from the manager’s favorite choice are
π∗t (1) = Atκ
∗ − (1 + τ∗)Φ
So the optimal choice is to rubber-stamp if and only if:
Atq
σ−1 < Atκ
∗ − τ∗Φ
QED.
Proposition 1 says that governance decisions are characterized by a simple cutoff rule:
strict profit maximization is enforced in all firms with governance quality above Qt, while
managerial decisions are rubber-stamped in all firms below the cutoff. The factor At cap-
tures the influence of the state of the economy on the profits of the firms: higher output Yt
means higher profits, and higher marginal cost 1θt
³
Rt
1−α
´1−α ¡
Wt
α
¢α
means lower profits. The
influence of the parameter τ∗ is straightforward. The influence of η∗ is slightly more subtle:
The profit losses are summarized by the function κ (η∗), which is concave and reaches a
maximum for η∗ = 0. Starting from the optimal size (km, lm), a small deviation by η∗
implies only a second order loss in profits.
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The measure of firms that rubber-stamp managerial propositions is F (Qt). The crucial
point is that it is an increasing function of At. This result follows from the assumption
that monitoring costs come from lower productivity: These costs are large when At is large.
On the other hand, the cost of rubber-stamping is less than proportional to A because of
the fixed component τ∗. As a consequence, shareholders are more inclined to rubber-stamp
managerial propositions in good times.
The profit margins of firms with bad governance are persistently lower than the ones of
better governed firms. This fits figure 1. The model also implies that firms with different
governance qualities have different cyclical properties: Firms with excellent governance
always maximize profits, while firms with bad governance follow the objective function
of their manager when At is large and the objective function of the shareholders when
At is small. As a consequence, their capital spending increases and decreases more than
proportionally with the business cycle. This fits figure 29.
The next step is to investigate the quantitative implications of governance conflicts.
5 Amplification
Before turning to the simulations of the model, it is useful to present the intuition for the
result that corporate governance amplifies aggregate fluctuations. From the definition of
the aggregate price level and from the pricing decisions of the intermediate goods producers,
one can obtain the following equation
µ× χt =
h
(1 + η∗)
1
µ × F (Qt) +G (Qt)
i 1
σ−1
(8)
where
χt ≡
1
θt
µ
Rt
1− α
¶1−αµWt
α
¶α
is the marginal cost associated with the Cobb-Douglas production function. F (Qt) =R Qt
0 f (q) dq and G (Qt) =
R 1
Qt
qσ−1f (q) dq. Equation (8) is shared by all general equilibrium
models of imperfect competition where the pricing behavior of firms is described by pitPt =
9Note that the relationship can be non monotonic. In theory, a firm whose manager is totally entrenched
will not react to aggregate shocks, simply because shareholders don’t have a say. The question of whether
such firms exist in the US is open, but the evidence in section 2 suggests that, in any event, such firms are
rare. Of course, if one wants to apply this framework to other economies (emerging markets for instance),
one would have to reconsider this question.
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µit × χit. Most models focus on the symmetric equilibrium where all firms have the same
marginal cost and the same markup. In a symmetric equilibrium, one would get the simple
condition: µ× χt = 1. In my model however, firms differ in both their marginal costs and
their markups. Firms that choose to delegate control have, on average, higher productivity
and lower markups than other firms. Equation (8) can be seen either as defining the
aggregate markup as a weighted average of the firms’ markups or as defining the aggregate
marginal cost as a weighted average of the firms’ marginal costs. Because the markup choices
are correlated with firms’ idiosyncratic productivity, one cannot in general disentangle the
aggregate markup from the aggregate marginal cost.
Consider equation (7), that defines the cutoff Qt. In this equation, the RHS increases
with Wt and Rt and decreases with Yt. We can now understand the amplification mecha-
nism. Consider the case of a positive shock. Following the shock, output and factor prices
increase. If factor supplies are elastic, output will increase more than the real wage and
rental price and this will push the cutoff Qt to the left. Some firms will then hire more
capital and labor and increase their output. Again, if factor supplies are elastic, this will
increase output more than Rt and Wt, and Qt will move further to the left10. We therefore
expect the amplification mechanism to be stronger when factor supplies are elastic. This
is why the presence of capacity utilization is quantitatively important in this model. It is
well understood that capacity utilization makes the standard RBC model more responsive
to shocks. Here, this will also apply to the amplification factor over and above what the
RBC would predict.
6 Calibration
The calibration exercise is conceptually straightforward. I take the standard technological
parameters from the textbook, and I choose the parameters that describe the governance
environment in order to match the results in Table 1 (columns 3 and 6, sample 1980-2001).
The steady state is computed to match the standard ratios ( CGDP ,
WL
GDP ,
K
GDP ). The labor
supply elasticity is φ = 4 as in the benchmark RBC model. The elasticity of substitution
10This suggests that the model could have multiple equilibria. This is indeed a possibility. For the
parameter values that I estimate however, firm level heterogeneity
³
q
i
´
is large enough to remove this
possibility.
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between goods is σ = 4, which implies a value-added markup of 33% as in Rotemberg and
Woodford (1999). Recall that free entry drives the profits to 0 on the balanced growth
path: This pins down N as a function of Φ (normalized to 1) and σ. The adjustment
cost parameter is γ = 4 (at quarterly frequency), following Hall (2002). The elasticity of
depreciation with respect to utilization is 0.1 as in King and Rebelo (1999), and the steady
state utilization is normalized to u = 1.
µ σ φ γ δ
”(1)
δ0(1)
1.33 4 4 4 0.1
The governance environment is characterized by η∗, τ∗ and the distribution F (q). I
assume that q is distributed uniformly over
£
q, q¯
¤
. I choose the four parameters
©
η∗, τ∗, q, q¯
ª
to match the results in Table 1. This involves guessing initial values for the parameters,
simulating a large number of firms and plotting the implied profit margins and investment
betas for the quantiles of the governance distribution. The results are then compared to
the ones in figure 2, and the exercise is repeated until they match. Note that the model
must be solved at each iteration since aggregate and firm dynamics are jointly determined.
The results are shown on figure 3a, b. The parameters are:
τ∗ η∗ q q¯
22% 20% .91 .99
In steady state, the cutoff is such that F (Q) = 21%.
Are these parameters consistent with what we know about corporate governance? Denis
and Kruse (2000) show that corporate restructuring is triggered by declines in performance
and that it involves major cost cutting efforts, plant closing, asset sales and layoffs. These
restructuring efforts increase shareholder value (see also Gilson (1998)). Denis and Denis
(1995) show that firms experience an average employment decline of 16 to 19% following
a normal retirement of the CEO at age 65, suggesting that firms are on average too fat11.
Similarly, Kaplan (1989) finds that MBOs are followed by declines in employment, sales
and investment, and by increases in profits. All this is consistent with my assumption
about η∗ and τ∗. More specifically for τ∗, Berger and Ofek (1999) show that the amount
of unallocated expenses is a strong determinant of corporate refocusing programs. They
11The figure rises to more than 40% after a forced resignation of the CEO. But this is of course an
endogenous event, so this number cannot be taken at face value.
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also show that disciplinary events (shareholder pressure, financial distress, management
turnover) usually occur before refocusing takes place and are followed by average cumulative
abnormal returns of 7%.
One can also obtain evidence from the literature that studies the effects of leverage on
firms’ behavior. Leverage has long been proposed as an efficient way to limit managerial
discretion (Jensen (1986)). Empirically, one sees that more highly leveraged firms charge
higher prices and respond more quickly and more strongly to shocks: Phillips (1995), Sharpe
(1994), Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996). Kovenock and Phillips (1997) confirm the results
in Kaplan (1989) that LBO firms decrease their investment and show that this effect is
stronger in highly concentrated industries. The idea that leverage can be used to put
pressure on insiders is also directly supported by the fact that boards increase the leverage
of their companies in response to increases in unions’ power (Gorton and Schmid (2000)
for Germany, Bronars and Deere (1991) for the US). This prompted me to check whether
leverage was relevant for my analysis: The results in table 1 do not change if one controls
for leverage. Note, however, that my sample includes only large, publicly traded companies
and that the results could be different for smaller firms.
7 Impulse Responses and Simulations
I log-linearize the model around its balanced growth path and I conduct two independent
simulations, one for the labor shock zt = log (Zt) and one for the technology shock θt.
Except for real wages, the properties of the model do not depend on which shock is used,
and I report only the results for the driving process zt. All time series are detrended using
the HP filter.
Figure 4 shows the response of the economy to a positive, persistent shock to log (Z).
The shock is the dotted line. GDP is the solid line. The third line represents the fraction
of firms whose CEOs enjoy some discretion. All the responses are in deviation from steady
state. Following a shock of 1% to log(Z), GDP increases by 2.5% and the fraction of loosely
controlled firms increases from 21% (steady state) to 22.3%.
Figure 5 shows the amplification coming from the governance mechanism. In response to
the same shock as in figure 4, the economy without governance conflict experiences a smaller
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increase in GDP. This shows the quantitative importance of the amplification mechanism
described above.
In the simulations using historical data, the driving process (in logs) zt is specified as
an AR(1):
zt = ρzt−1 + εt
Note however that zt is not observable in the data and that ρ is not known. The calibration
procedure follows the strategy used by King and Rebelo (1999). I make an initial guess for
ρ. Given this guess, I solve the model using rational expectations. The solution takes the
form
yˆt = βyk × kˆt + βyz × zt
The coefficient βyk and βyz are complex functions of all the parameters of the model and of
ρ. This equation for output can be inverted into zt = 1βyz × yˆt−
βyk
βyz
× kˆt. Using actual values
for yˆt and kˆt, one can create a series for zt. One can then compute the AR(1) coefficient
for this series. It is, in general, different from the original ρ. This value is then used as a
new starting point. The procedure is repeated until convergence. The estimated value of ρ
is .886 (I estimated essentially the same values of ρ for z and for θ).
Figure 6 shows the simulated economy. The match in the top panel is mechanical:
the shocks are chosen to fit the GDP series. The other 3 panels suggest that the model
generates reasonable time series for the main macroeconomic variables. Figure 7 shows
the time series of the fraction of firms that are loosely controlled. This fraction is higher
in booms and lower in recession, thereby increasing aggregate volatility: For the same
realizations of the exogenous shocks (z or θ), the economy would have been 32.9% less
volatile without governance conflicts. Figure 8 shows the historical Solow residual (defined
in the standard way) and the simulated residual for the economy driven by the labor shock z.
In this economy, short run fluctuations in the residual are due to the presence of fixed costs
and variation in capacity utilization, not to aggregate technology shocks12. The simulated
time series for the residual is close to its empirical counterpart, even though the model
was not calibrated for that purpose. Among other things, this means that I could have
chosen the shocks to fit the residuals, as in the RBC tradition (instead of the GDP series),
12The true technology is not exactly constant because Qt moves with the business cycle. The impact on
the residual is small, however, as can be seen on the figure.
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and the model would have implied reasonable time series for GDP, consumption, hours and
investment.
For the behavior of the real wage, the governance model generates a first order improve-
ment over the alternative, in the case of business cycles driven by non-technological shocks.
The model without endogenous governance and driven by zt predicts a counter-cyclical real
wage: its correlation with the actual (HP-filtered) wage series is -57%. The governance
model, on the other hand, delivers a correlation of +52%, because positive shocks induce
firms to leave more discretion to insiders who are more willing to hire for a given real wage,
and who are also more efficient at doing so. The aggregate labor demand therefore shifts
out in good times, and this shift compensates the impact of decreasing returns to labor.
8 Conclusion
Consistent with the predictions of a simple model of firm governance, I have shown that
badly governed firms have lower profit margins and are more cyclical than well governed
firms. I have studied the mechanism through which governance conflicts amplify aggregate
shocks. When times are good, insiders enjoy more control over the decisions of their firms,
which leads to more hiring and more investment spending. These hiring and investment
decisions feed-back into the aggregate and amplify the boom. The quantitative analysis
suggests that corporate governance may be responsible for 30% of aggregate volatility.
While the goal of this paper was to provide a positive analysis of corporate governance
over the business cycle, one can also use the framework to study normative questions.
Several points are worth emphasizing. First, there is a close link between the normative
and positive properties of the model: In booms, the labor demand shifts out since managers
over-hire but profits must increase since this is what makes shareholders more willing to tol-
erate managerial misbehavior. Higher wages and higher profits mean that the amplification
mechanism I have studied is a Pareto improvement. This is possible because shareholder
value maximization is not the same as social value maximization when goods markets are
not perfectly competitive. A second, related, point is that, from a macro-economic point of
view, one should distinguish between different types of deviations from shareholder value,
contrary to what the corporate finance literature usually does. In this paper, the key dis-
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tinction was between productive and unproductive deviations. Unproductive deviations
(stealing, excessive compensation, inefficient organizational choices to preserve private in-
terests) are bad for both society and shareholders. On the other hand, productive deviations
(excessive R&D spending, reluctance to close down plants) create some social surplus as
long as all markets are not perfectly competitive, and even though these deviations could
become so large as to reduce social welfare, they should not be confused with the non
productive deviations. It is perfectly possible for the economy to be closer to achieving
aggregate efficiency exactly at the time where deviations from shareholder value are more
common. Finally, a policy recommendation which is likely to be robust to the details of
the model is that improving competition in the goods markets would bring the additional
benefit of reducing the social costs of governance conflicts.
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A Evidence
I start by matching the quarterly COMPUSTAT files with the data provided by Andrew
Metrick on his web page. The governance index can potentially vary over time: I keep
firms whose index has a standard deviation of less than one over the sample period (in
practice the index is quite persistent). I keep only those firms that report non missing
values for sales between 1989 and 2001. This leaves me with 626 firms. I take GDP, the
non-residential private fixed investment and their deflators from the NIPA. I construct the
annual growth rate of (deflated) capital expenditures of firm i at time t: git = log (capexi,t)−
log (capexi,t−1). I winsorize this growth rate at 5-95% within each period to make sure that
the results are not driven by outliers. I run the panel regression with fixed effects (αi)
git = αi + β (agei, industryi, governancei)× g¯t + εit
Industry is the one digit SIC code for firm i. Age is age group in the first year of the sample,
using 5 groups and cutoffs at percentiles (10, 25, 50, 75). Equivalently, I have also computed
the betas by running a time series regression for each firm, and adjusting later for age and
industry effects. The results are the same.
B Governance Model
I now outline a simple moral hazard model and discuss the role of financial incentives. The
main idea is the same as in the text: managers come up with new ideas that deliver pro-
ductivity qit = 1 but they do not share the objectives of the stockholders. The focus on
CEO and shareholders is purely for convenience: The same model would apply to moral
hazard problems inside the firm, between CEO and division managers for instance. There
are 2 ways to implement the new technology and the manager chooses a probability dis-
tribution (e˜, 1− e˜) over the two implementations, and e˜ can take two values: e˜ = e or 1.
Each implementation delivers profits (πt) and private benefits (Bt). Private benefits are
not transferable and e˜ is not observable. I interpret the model as follows: managers can
expand effort to cut all unnecessary expenses, fire all unnecessary employees, invest only
the optimal amount of resources into new projects, etc.. These efforts are both costly for
the manager and difficult to observe for the shareholders.
• Probability e˜: πt = At andBt = 0.
• Probability 1− e˜: πt = Atκ∗ − τ∗Φ and Bt = τ∗Φ+ bAt.
Assumption A1 : (1− e) (1− κ∗) < b < 1− κ∗
The second inequality of Assumption 1 implies that the first best is to implement e˜FB =
1: if e˜ were contractible, all firms would choose e˜FB = 1 in every period. However, when
e˜ is not contractible, the first inequality of A1 implies that the second best (with general
financial incentives and limited liability) is to implement e˜SB = e.
In such a world, the possibility to intervene directly is obviously valuable: this is what
the monitoring technology q
i
does. A firm will choose the direct monitoring if and only if
qσ−1
i
At > eAt + (1− e) (Atκ∗ − τ∗Φ)
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Note that I can always choose b and e such that A1 holds and e is close to 0. In this case,
the model boils down to the one used in the text. The cutoff is given by:
Qt =
µ
κ∗ − τ
∗Φ
At
¶ 1
σ−1
C Technical Details
The setup takes into account both capacity utilization (u) and adjustment costs (γ). I
use
−→
C to denote the fact that C has a trend (to be removed as soon as all the FOCs are
derived). Consumers maximize:
max
Lt,Ct
X
t
βt
µ
log
³−→
C t
´
− 1
Zt
φ
φ+ 1
L
φ+1
φ
t
¶
Subject to the budget constraint
−→
K t+1 = (1− δ (ut))
−→
K t +
−→
W tLt + utRt
−→
K t +
−→
Π t −
−→
C t −
γ
2
µ−→
K t+1
(1+g) −
−→
K t
¶2
−→
K t
There is monopolistic competition in the intermediate goods markets. The production
function is: −→y it = qit θt
−→
k 1−αit
¡
(1 + g)t lit
¢α
Note that k denotes the flow of capital services (including the u term) and l is labor. θt
is an aggregate productivity shock, qit is firm’s idiosyncratic productivity. (1 + g) is the
Harrod-neutral trend growth. The profits are
−→π it =
pit
pt
−→y it −
−→
W tlit −Rt
−→
k it −
−→
Φ it
−→
Φ it =
−→
Φ × (1 + τ it)
There is a fixed cost in terms of goods
³−→
Φ
´
indexed on aggregate productivity to keep the
number of firms constant on the balanced growth path. I now remove the trend (1 + g)t.
Define for the wage (and similarly for all other trending variables):
Wt =
−→
W t
(1 + g)t
So the marginal cost of firm i is
cit =
χt
qit
χt ≡
1
θt
µ
Rt
1− α
¶1−αµWt
α
¶α
Let’s compute first the monopoly solution
max
µ
pit
pt
− cit
¶
yit
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This monopolist chooses a markup µ = σσ−1 and prices at
pmit
pt
= µχtqit . The quantities
produced and hired are:
ymit =
Yt
N
µ
1
µcit
¶σ
=
Yt
N (µχt)
σ q
σ
it
lmit =
α
1− α
Rt
Wt
kmit
kmit =
ymit
θtqit
µ
1− α
α
Wt
Rt
¶α
The profits of the firm are:
πmit = Atq
σ−1
it − Φ
At ≡ (µχt)1−σ
Yt
σN
But the manager proposes a bigger firm
lit
lmit
=
kit
kmit
= 1 + ηit
pit
pmit
= (1 + ηit)
− 1σ
The profits become:
πit = Atq
σ−1
it κ (ηit)− Φ− τ itΦ
κ (ηit) ≡ (1 + ηit)×
µ (1 + ηit)
− 1σ − 1
µ− 1
The aggregate price level condition is:Z 1
0
(qit)
σ−1 (1 + ηit)
σ−1
σ = (µχt)
σ−1
And the aggregate demands for capital and labor are:
Ldt
Kdt
=
α
1− α
Rt
Wt
Kdt =
µ
1− α
α
Wt
Rt
¶α
Ψt
(µχt)
σ
Yt
θt
Ψt ≡
Z 1
0
(1 + ηit) q
σ−1
it
The equilibrium in the capital market gives:
Kdt = utKt
20
C.1 Complete Model
Firms with good governance (q
i
> Qt) choose to enforce shareholders rights. Other firms
Governance decisions lead to:
Ψt ≡
Z 1
0
(1 + ηit) q
σ−1
it =
Z Qt
0
(1 + η∗) f (q) dq +
Z 1
Qt
qσ−1f (q) dq
Ψt = (1 + η
∗)× F (Qt) +G (Qt)
F (Qt) =
Z Qt
0
f (q) dq
G (Qt) =
Z 1
Qt
qσ−1f (q) dq
And for the marginal cost I get:
χt =
1
µ
·Z 1
0
(1 + ηit)
σ−1
σ qσ−1it
¸ 1
σ−1
χt =
1
µ
h
(1 + η∗)
1
µ × F (Qt) +G (Qt)
i 1
σ−1
So the complete model is described by the following equations:
• Labor supply and labor demand:
Lt =
µ
ZtWt
Ct
¶φ
Lt
utKt
=
α
1− α
Rt
Wt
• Euler equation
1
Ct
µ
1 + γ
Kt+1 −Kt
Kt
¶
=
β
1 + g
Et
·
1
Ct+1
µ
1 + ut+1Rt+1 − δt+1 + γ
Kt+2 −Kt+1
Kt+1
¶¸
• Utilization
δ0 (ut) = Rt
• Capital accumulation
(1 + g)Kt+1 = Yt + (1− δ (ut))Kt − Ct −NΦ−NΦτ∗F (Qt)−
γ
2
(Kt+1 −Kt)2
Kt
• Capital demand
utKt =
µ
1− α
α
Wt
Rt
¶α
Ψt
(µχt)
σ
Yt
θt
• Marginal cost
χt ≡
1
θt
µ
Rt
1− α
¶1−αµWt
α
¶α
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• The cutoff is such that
qσ−1
t
At = Atκ
∗ − τ∗Φ
At ≡ (µχt)1−σ
Yt
σN
• Finally the free entry condition says that (unconditional) expected profits have to be
0. This assumes for simplicity that governance is randomly drawn after entry.
E [πit] = 0
22
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
0.109 0.080 0.061 0.064 0.095 0.112
2.880 1.960 2.520 2.450 2.720 2.990
0.446 0.382 0.213 0.226 0.384 0.498
1.840 1.510 1.380 1.410 1.730 2.160
0.942 0.708 0.492 0.462 0.812 0.916
2.990 2.110 2.430 2.150 2.800 2.980
Firm Age Dummies no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes
Industry Dummies no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes no yes
Firm Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2    % 14.28 14.54 14.28 14.54 22.94 23.16 22.93 23.15 25.74 25.90 25.74 25.90
N. Firms 617 617 617 617 626 626 626 626 622 622 622 622
N. Observations 7829 7829 7829 7829 8025 8025 8025 8025 7790 7790 7790 7790
Table 1. Estimation of Firm Sensitivity to Aggregate Shocks. Sensitivity of capital expenditures (regressions 1 to 4) is the coefficient from the 
regression of the growth rate of capital expenditures on the growth rate of aggregate investment, interacted with governance and other control variables. Only interaction 
coefficients are reported. Same regressions are run for sales (on GDP) and for employment (on aggregate employment). To make comparison across regressions 
meaningful, all aggregate variables are rescaled so that average beta is 1 in the sample. See appendix for details on data. The omitted category for Governance is 
1<G<=7 (Good Governance). Regression coefficients are in bold, t-statistics in italics. Sample period: 1989-2001. Annual Data.
Dependent Variable
Investment Sales Employment
8 <= G <= 12
13 <= G
Other Controls interacted with Growth Rate of Aggregate Variable
Governance Index used as Linear Regressor (from 5 to 14), interacted with Growth Rate of Aggregate Variable
G
Governance Index used to create Governance Categories, interacted with Growth Rate of Aggregate Variable
N. Firms
Notes: Income over capital expenditures is rescaled to have mean of 1. Sample size (number of firms) for each governance category is indicated
on the graph. Source: Compustat annual files for accounting data and Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) for governance data.
Fig. 1: Profitability
1989-2001, Sector-Age adjusted
M
e
d
i
a
n
 
I
n
c
o
m
e
 
o
v
e
r
 
M
e
d
i
a
n
 
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
E
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
s
Governance Category
1 2 3
.9
.95
1
1.05
1.1
130
395
101
N. Firms
Notes: Regression beta of capital expenditures growth on aggregate investment growth (2a) and sales growth on GDP
growth (2b). Betas are rescaled to have mean of 1 and are adjusted for sector and age groups. Regression results are reported
in Table 1. Sample size (number of firms) for each governance category is indicated on the graph. Source: Compustat annual
files for accounting data and Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) for governance data.
Fig. 2a: Sensitivity of Investment to Aggregate Shocks
1989-2001, Sector-Age adjusted
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Fig. 2b: Sensitivity of Sales to Aggregate Shocks
1989-2001, Sector-Age adjusted
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Notes: The distribution of firms in 3 groups corresponds to the empirical distribution: 130 have good governance (category 1, bottom 25%), 395 have normal 
governance (category 2, middle 50%), and 101 have bad governance (category 3, top 25%). The model matches the number of firms (exactly), the average profit 
margin and the average beta in each group (approximately).
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